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A B S T R A C T
This study develops a controlled laboratory experiment to ex-
amine the effects of personal recognition on charitable giving.
I find evidence that both the possibility of acquiring prestige
and the desire to avoid shame motivate individuals to give in
recognition situations. Furthermore, I show that the possibility
of being recognized is more important than the distinguishing
value of that recognition, suggesting that an offer of recognition
has greater power to increase charitable contributions when a
larger proportion of donors will be recognized.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
Charities rely on individual contributions to provide many im-
portant services for those most in need. As a result, charities
are constantly tasked with convincing individuals to give away
their savings or salaries to provide public goods for others. De-
spite this challenge, charitable donations in the US exceed two
percent of gross domestic product annually, and 89 percent
of households give each year (List (2011), Independent Sector
(2001)). The sheer magnitude and frequency of these contribu-
tions suggests that these donations are not an anomaly for stan-
dard, rational decision makers, but rather, a true expression of
individuals’ preferences.
Historically, charities have tried a variety of fundraising strate-
gies in an effort to take advantage of these preferences. How-
ever, no universal consensus regarding optimal fundraising prac-
tices has emerged. In lieu of this consensus, research has aimed
to continue identifying and characterizing the set of non-standard
preferences that motivate individuals to give to charity. This
knowledge has incrementally armed charities with more effi-
cient fundraising practices, which in turn help charities raise
additional funds, broaden their reach, and set more ambitious
goals.
Despite the initial dearth of knowledge in this area, chari-
ties have known for some time that acquiring new donors is
more costly than attempting to fundraise from existing ones.
In research focused on relationship marketing, Harley (1984)
and Petersen (1997) showed that customer acquisition could be
five times as costly as customer retention, while Sargeant (2001)
proved that this effect extended to donors in the non-profit sec-
tor. As a result, charities often must convince an existing donor
base to contribute when attempting to raise additional funds.1
I define an existing donor base as the group of previous donors
1 In this paper, I assume that the cost of acquiring new donors is prohibitive.
In other words, charities are stuck attempting to maximize the donations
of their existing donor base. A different field within the charitable giving
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to a charity, plus non-profit volunteers, employees, and anyone
who has demonstrated interest in the charity’s cause through
subscription to a mailing list or similar group. Existing donor
bases provide a stark challenge for every charity. Every time
the charity wishes to raise additional funds, it must return to
its donor base and convince its members to contribute once
again.
The simplest strategy charities utilize to raise additional funds
is to ask donors to contribute more money. However, early re-
search has established that many alternatives are more effective
than simply asking for additional contributions. Some exam-
ples include securing seed money to use in a matching or chal-
lenge campaign (Potters et al. (2005), Rondeau and List (2008)),
public recognition of donors (Rege and Telle (2004), Andreoni
and Petrie (2004), Dana et al. (2006)), and offering material re-
wards in exchange for donations (Falk (2004)). In this paper, I
focus on public recognition because it presents some interesting
and unanswered questions.
When utilizing public recognition, some charities choose to
recognize a large proportion of their donors, while others choose
to recognize a small proportion, or set dollar-denominated cut-
offs for recognition. For example, the Clinton Foundation, an
international philanthropic fund, publishes the name of every
one of their donors on their website. In contrast, Scholarship
America, an American education charity, only recognizes a small
proportion of their donors by offering membership in their Jef-
ferson Society in exchange for annual contributions exceeding
fixed amounts. This includes a President’s Circle which re-
quires contributions exceeding $100,000 annually. This strate-
gic diversity presents a classic optimization problem. The more
donors a charity offers to recognize, the more likely potential
donors are to be recognized. However, as a greater propor-
tion of donors are recognized, that recognition becomes less
valuable because it will distinguish donors from fewer of their
peers.
This paper explores public recognition’s ability to motivate
additional contributions, the mechanism through which public
recognition motivates these contributions, and the optimal pro-
portion of donor recognition. I develop a public good labora-
tory game and use evidence from the game to reproduce prior
results that personal recognition is an effective strategy for mo-
literature focuses on donor acquisition, but that is outside the scope of this
paper. See List (2011) for a brief overview.
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tivating an existing donor base to contribute more to a cause.
Furthermore, using this evidence, I investigate the manner in
which personal recognition influences potential donors. I show
that personal recognition motivates contributions through shame,
or the costs associated with not receiving recognition, and pres-
tige, or the benefits associated with receiving recognition. Fi-
nally, I also develop intuition suggesting that receiving recogni-
tion is more important than the value of recognition. Therefore,
it is better for charities to offer a high chance of donor recogni-
tion to illicit increased donations, rather than offer a low chance
of recognition and hope the distinguishing characteristic of this
recognition will motivate donors to give more. Section 2 of this
paper reviews the charitable giving literature. Section 3 de-
scribes this study’s empirical strategy, including a description
of the laboratory game. Section 4 presents my results, and Sec-
tion 5 concludes.
2
L I T E R AT U R E R E V I E W
The literature on charitable giving has grown rapidly in recent
years, and Andreoni and Payne (2011) break this growth down
into four categories, individuals, giving as a market, the inher-
ent sociality of giving, and the giver’s mind. The literature on
individuals focuses on personal incentives, and how individu-
als respond to them. The literature on the charitable giving mar-
ket takes an aggregate approach, investigating both the supply
and demand for donations, government intervention, and inter-
actions between the market participants. Research concerning
the social aspects of giving seeks to explain donations from
a prosocial perspective, investigating how human interactions,
their levels of publicity, and emotions change the way individu-
als donate. Finally, the literature exploring the giver’s mind at-
tempts to pinpoint specific motivations on the individual level,
and discern their consequences on a broader scale.
2.1 the individual
Research on individuals and incentives first stemmed from an
interest in the effects of tax deductions on charitable giving.
The US government has offered preferential tax treatment for
donors since the Revenue Act of 1917, absed on the idea that
any foregone tax revenue due to charity related tax breaks is
less valuable than the additional dollars given to charity be-
cause of the breaks. In other words, tax deductions on char-
itable donations make sense as long as the price elasticity of
charitable giving is ≤ −1. This led Andreoni (2006) to label a
price elasticity of −1 as the golden standard, which has been
used repeatedly as a benchmark in the literature.
Taussig (1967) made the first well-known attempt to estimate
this elasticity using tax returns, laying the groundwork for Feld-
stein and Clotfelter (1976), which estimated giving’s elasticity
between −1.1 and −1.5, a significant step forward for propo-
nents of tax breaks. Later, other studies including Feldstein and
8
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Taylor (1976), Clotfelter (1985), and Feenberg (1987) achieved
similar results while accounting for shortcomings of the initial
study, and using different data sets. However, this universal
agreement in the literature would not last.
By the 1990s, the availability of richer IRS datasets led to dif-
ferent, conflicting estimates of the price elasticity of charitable
giving. Particularly, Randolph (1995) called into question previ-
ous estimates by utilizing instruments to identify a much lower
permanent price elasticity of giving, and a higher transitory
elasticity of giving. While this research supported the idea that
tax breaks were unfit to incentivize charitable giving, shortly
thereafter, Auten et al. (2002) used similar data but achieved a
different result by assuming a constant elasticity and using a
log-log specification.
More recently, projects such as Tiehen (2001), O’Neil et al.
(1996), and Bakija and Heim (2011) have confirmed that the
price elasticity of giving is ≤ −1, although with some compli-
cations. For example, Bakija and Heim (2011) did separate anal-
yses for households with incomes above and below $200,000,
finding that the government lost revenue relative to the increase
in charitable giving due to tax breaks for lower income house-
holds, while the effect was opposite for higher income house-
holds.
Despite the many complications, the body of current evi-
dence does appear to suggest that the price elasticity of char-
itable giving is ≤ −1, and therefore, tax breaks deserve at least
some consideration when attempting to stimulate charitable
giving. However, charities have not been willing to stand by
and let the government handle incentive provision for donors.
Instead, they have also taken matters into their own hands, of-
ten by providing material incentives for donors.
For example, National Public Radio raises millions each year
while offering pens, coffee mugs and tote bags in exchange
for small donations. Surprisingly, and despite the prevalence
of this strategy, research is uncertain of its effectiveness. In-
tuitively, it seems that offering some material reward for do-
nating should make individuals more likely to contribute, and
to contribute more. However, Holmes et al. (2002) and Shang
and Croson (2009) both discovered in field experiments that do-
nations tended to bunch around amounts necessary to receive
gifts, raising the possibility that donors treated these contribu-
tions as purchases rather than donations. While the amounts
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necessary to receive gifts may have encouraged more donations,
it is also possible that these benchmarks decreased donations.
Rather than making donations transactional, it is also pos-
sible that material incentives may discourage donations alto-
gether. For example, Newman and Shen (2012) found in a set
of experiments that offering thank-you gifts, or gifts given in
exchange for a donation, actually decreases donations regard-
less of charity, gift desirability, or gift value. One explanation
for this result is that offering thank-you gifts in exchange for
donations may create a crowding out effect (see Bowles (2008),
Frey (2001)). This idea is supported by lab work such as Hey-
man and Ariely (2004), which finds that individuals are less
likely to engage in altruistic tasks for a monetary reward than
a non-monetary incentive. In a similar vein, Ariely et al. (2009)
show that monetary incentives dilute the social benefits of act-
ing prosocially. Both of these studies point to the possibility
that donors derive some social or personal utility from con-
tributing to a charity without recompense, and whether that
utility is socially or personally rooted, the provision of addi-
tional material incentives that attempt to encourage a donation
actually reduces or eliminates that utility.
Tax breaks and material incentives have proven to be more
complicated than they first appeared. Both examples make it
clear that individuals and their incentives provide one compli-
cated way to break down charitable giving, but that we cannot
come close to learning everything we would like to while only
pursuing this approach. In fact, individual incentives might
make little difference at all when applied only to small groups.
It is only when these incentives are manipulated or applied on
a large scale that we may begin to see shifts in the aggregate
market. Therefore, it will be helpful to discuss the market as a
whole, both to acquire an aggregate viewpoint, and to observe
the market conditions that charities might seek to take advan-
tage of, or change by manipulating incentives.
2.2 the charitable giving market
The charitable giving market has three players; donors provide
the supply of charitable contributions, non-profits create the
demand for these donations and the services, and the govern-
ment alters tax policy, distributes grant money, and provides
some public services itself. The literature focused on the aggre-
gate market looks for trends in supply and demand, and traces
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those trends back to individual policies that affect both chari-
ties demand for contributions, and donors desire to contribute.
In a survey of the entire market, List (2011) draws a number
of interesting conclusions. First, the market is growing rapidly,
as charitable giving in the US has climbed steadily from 1.5% of
GDP in the 1990s to over 2% by 2011, and this growth has out-
paced the SP 500. Furthermore, during this period of growth,
charitable giving has been significantly more responsive to up-
ward trends in the economy than downward trends. To com-
plement this growth in supply, the number of charitable organi-
zations registered with the IRS grew nearly 60% between 1995
and 2005. Second, most giving is to religious causes. In 2006,
these donations made up 61% of all contributions in the US. In
addition, when examined over time, contributions to religious
causes are stable as a percentage of income, and unaffected by
economic fluctuations, while contributions to other causes are
closely correlated with measures of economic strength. This
suggests a fundamental difference between religious donations,
and those to other non-profits.
List (2011) also delves more deeply into the supply of chari-
table contributions. While most households give, donation fre-
quency has a sharp income dependency. For example, only 39%
of households with income under $20,000 donate, while more
than 90% of households that make over $130,000 do.1 Further-
more, giving as a percentage of income follows a U shaped pat-
tern. Households making between $20,000 and $40,000 give 5%
of their income on average, while households making between
$40,000 and $75,000 give approximately 2%. At the rich end
of the spectrum, according to Center on Philanthropy at Indi-
ana University (2007), households making more than $1,000,000
give more than 5% on average, and according to Auten et al.
(2000), the richest 1.4% of households give 86% of all charita-
ble gifts. While this U shaped distribution of giving appears
counterintuitive, James and Sharpe (2007) explain it by suggest-
ing many low income households are actually retired individu-
als donating out of accumulated wealth rather than current in-
come, thus skewing low income household donations upwards.
While most charitable contributions come from individuals,
the government also distributes some grant money to charities.
These grants have spurred research searching for crowding out
1 This is important evidence supporting Bakija and Heim(2012)’s assertion
that lower income household’s donations to charity are much less respon-
sive to tax breaks than rich household’s contributions
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to determine if the grants are truly helping charities advance
their missions. Eckel and Johnston (2005) ran a lab experi-
ment in which subjects were allowed to split money between
a charity and themselves, and in some trials subjects were told
the charity was receiving a grant from the experimenters. In
this experiment, there was almost complete crowding out of
individual donations. Taking a different approach, Andreoni
(2003) and Andreoni and Payne (2009) use a charity’s fundrais-
ing expenses as an instrument, and examining both fundrais-
ing expenditures, grant money, and funds raised, they find that
the presence of a grant reduces charitable contributions. How-
ever, this reduction is mostly due to decreases in fundraising
expenditures, while the presence of the grant actually brings
in additional contributions by acting as a signal of legitimacy
for the charity. Clearly, the effect of government grants is still
somewhat uncertain, and the limited evidence of crowding out
warrants further investigation.
While an aggregate market view advances our knowledge
of charitable giving, it is still unable to explain many of the
phenomena we observe. While traditional incentives like tax
breaks and material objects can explain some fluctuations in
giving, they leave other questions unanswered, and sometimes
have the opposite effects that they are supposed to. To help
answer some of these puzzles, it will be useful to consider the
social nature of giving.
2.3 the social nature of giving
Giving to charity is an inherently social action, and overlooking
the communal nature of helping those in need is a poor simpli-
fication. Therefore, economists have attempted to address this
social aspect of giving by characterizing how individuals per-
ceive each other, and want to be perceived, when donating to
charity. Ariely et al. (2009) characterize this sociality as im-
age motivation, or an individuals tendency to be motivated
partly by others perceptions, while Andreoni and Petrie (2004)
describe the same phenomenon as audience effects.
There is significant evidence that individuals behave more
prosocially when their actions will improve their public image.
In some of the first research on this subject, Andreoni and Petrie
(2004) utilize a basic public good laboratory game with varying
levels of information and recognition between subjects. This
work was particularly important because before it, economists
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strictly protected the confidentiality of subjects in laboratory
games. By doing this, studies failed to account for the recog-
nition strategies real charities use to attempt to motivate do-
nations, and the public nature of many contributions. In An-
dreoni and Petrie’s experiment, the subjects played a public
good game on a computer where they had the opportunity to
contribute, with payoffs for their entire group, or keep money
for themselves. The authors found that in treatments where
subjects see pictures of the other members of their group, and
are told the amount the other subjects donated, contributions
to the public good increase significantly.
In similar work, Rege and Telle (2004) found increased do-
nations to a public good when subjects had to announce their
contributions to the good in front of the group, and Dana et al.
(2006) found that dictators would take less money from a dic-
tator game in exchange for receivers never knowing the game
had taken place. Continuing this line of research, Andreoni and
Bernheim (2009) expanded upon the effects of prosocial behav-
ior in dictator games by investigating the effects of an audience
on normative 50-50 splits. In their experiment, they hypothe-
size that dictators want others to believe they are fair. There-
fore, using the 50-50 split as a reference point, dictators should
avoid giving slightly less than 50-50, because they will appear
relatively unfair, but will also choose to give zero rather than
a small number close to zero, because in either situation, they
will be viewed as unfair. In their experiment, they observe this
exact double pooling equilibrium around zero and fifty, provid-
ing more evidence that others’ perceptions are a strong factor
in dictator’s decisions.
In contrast to research supporting recognition’s positive ef-
fect on prosocial behavior, recent analysis by Jones and Linardi
(2014) suggests recognition does not universally encourage proso-
cial behavior. Instead, the authors provide evidence of wallflower
preferences, where some individuals seek to avoid both posi-
tive and negative recognition. By avoiding extreme behavior
in either direction, individuals can attempt to take an aver-
age action, fulfilling their desire to remain unrecognized. It
follows that decisions motivated by wallflower preferences de-
pend heavily on expectations about average behavior, and there-
fore are also deeply rooted in social expectations. In this way,
wallflower preferences still are intrinsically social, despite their
discouragement of additional prosocial behavior.
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From all of this research, we have learned that individuals
truly care about others’ perceptions of them. They will often
behave more prosocially than if their actions were private to
improve their image, and will go so far as to forego monetary
incentives to preserve their reputation. Karlan and McConnell
(2014) helps clarify individual’s interest in behaving prosocially
by teasing out the difference between contributing in a chari-
table setting to motivate others to give, and to improve ones
own social standing. Using both a randomized field experi-
ment and lab experiment, they find that public recognition is
an important factor in the decision to donate to charity, and that
motivating others to give can not completely explain prosocial
behavior, validating image motivation as an important consid-
eration in the donation decision-making process.
However, heterogeneity limits the explanatory power of so-
cially motivated models of giving. While some individuals
may care deeply about social status and public image, others
may be wallflowers, while still others may not care about their
image at all. Therefore, to further categorize the donation deci-
sion making process, economists have sought to identify other
sets of preferences not rooted in prosocial behavior. Each in-
vestigation of prosocial behavior has brought us further from
a standard economic model in which money is the primary, or
only incentive, towards one in which we must account for a dif-
ferent set of preferences. While I have already discussed image
motivation as a social preference, any discussion of the chari-
table giving literature is not complete without considering the
set of other non-standard preferences.
2.4 the giver’s mind
Investigations of the giver’s mind seek to truly establish the mi-
crofoundations for a more comprehensive economic theory of
charitable giving, and therefore are closely related with other
branches of the literature. For example, considering the social
nature of giving immediately led economists to hypothesize
that personal recognition is a factor that individuals consider
when deciding whether to give or not. Another example is
the search for evidence of crowding out caused by government
grants. If government grants do crowd out individual dona-
tions, this crowding out may suggest that givers care that the
charity receives enough money to do its work, but do not care
if they themselves make the donation. If this were true, the
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giver’s utility function would increase over aggregate contribu-
tions. On the other hand, if government grants do not crowd
out charitable giving, this could suggest that donors have a per-
sonal desire to donate, and derive utility from the actual act
of donating, rather than from the charity receiving more aggre-
gate donations. To characterize this preference, a giver’s utility
function would increase over their own donations, but not oth-
ers.
An investigation of the giver’s mind seeks to answer why
individuals decide to donate to charity, but also seeks to com-
partmentalize that decision making process. The literature has
previously established altruism, warm glow, and social pres-
sure as three broad motivations for donating. As described
above, the altruistically motivated donor’s utility increases over
aggregate donations, because they are concerned with total con-
tributions to the charity more than their own donation. Alter-
natively, a donor may be primarily motivated by warm glow,
in which case their utility would increase over their own do-
nation, but be unaffected by other donations. In this case, the
donor derives utility from the act of donating, but not from the
effects of their contribution. Finally, and in contrast to altruism
and warm glow, social pressure models of giving hypothesize
that there is a negative utility associated with the solicitation
process or targeting of potential donors, who are motivated to
make a contribution to rid themselves of this negative utility.
Historically, Becker (1974), Andreoni (1989), and Andreoni
(1990) suggested supply-driven giving models, in which givers
gained additional utility from donations, fitting more closely
with an altruistic or warm glow approach to explaining char-
itable contributions. The key insight of these models was al-
lowing individuals to derive a benefit when they made a con-
tribution, or allowing donors to gain utility from giving away
money. These were the first significant steps away from a stan-
dard economic model to help explain charitable contributions
in any economic framework.
However, other research has established social pressure as
a third, and important factor in the donation decision-making
process. Originally, Akerlof and Kranton (2000) suggested a
demand-driven model of giving in which charitable givers lost
utility, in opposition to the supply-driven models discussed
above. Social pressure exists in a variety of scenarios, but the
most common example is door-to-door solicitation. In many
cases, the donor might pay the solicitor just to go away, to rid
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themselves of the annoyance of having to deal with the solic-
itor, and not because of any desire to contribute to a cause.
Other examples include Karlan and McConnell (2014), who
find evidence that donors may attempt to pressure other po-
tential donors into contributing, and Mas and Moretti (2009)
who observe social pressure in the workplace.
In an important project, DellaVigna et al. (2012) confirm the
existence and importance of social pressure by running a field
experiment with door-to-door solicitors to test aggregate wel-
fare effects of fundraising campaigns, and to differentiate be-
tween altruistic and social pressure determinants of giving. They
estimate a large net-negative welfare effect of door-to-door cam-
paigns, but also come up with a simple and elegant solution to
this problem. By giving potential donors the option to opt out
of the solicitation beforehand, we can mitigate the negative wel-
fare effects of door-to-door campaigns.
Furthermore, and more importantly for this paper, when
donors in the study were given an opt out option, total do-
nations decreased significantly, particularly smaller donations.
This is for two reasons, both of which provide evidence of so-
cial pressure. First, households who donate because of social
pressure are much less likely to answer their doors when noti-
fied in advance that the solicitor is coming because the advance
notification makes it easy for the household to avoid a negative
imposition of social pressure.2 Second, the presence of an opt
out option significantly reduces the frequency of donations <
$10, but has no negative effect on larger donations. The authors
posit that $10 is enough to rid potential donors of all negative
effects of social pressure, and therefore hypothesize that social
pressure is a primary determinant of the many small donations
they observe, but not of the larger, unaffected donations which
make up the rest of their observed contribution distribution.
In addition to altruism, warm glow, and social pressure, econ-
omists have identified prestige and shame as two donor mo-
tivations in recognition situations. Harbaugh (1998) defines
prestige as the utility that comes from having the amount of
a donation publicly known, which could be valuable for its di-
rect contribution to utility and social status. Conversely, where
prestige is the benefit associated with recognition, shame is the
2 Note that if giving were purely altruistic, any advance notification of solici-
tation would not make it less likely for a household to be present when the
solicitor arrives because the solicitation would impose no negative effect on
potential donors
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cost of not receiving recognition. In any instance of recognition,
those donors who are not recognized are implicitly identified
as the lowest donors. Shame motivates donors to contribute
more as they seek to avoid this implicit recognition as a bottom
donor.
In a series of recent studies, Anya Samek and Roman Shere-
meta investigate the ability of prestige and shame to motivate
charitable contributions. Samek and Sheremeta (2013) orga-
nized a public good game similar to Andreoni and Petrie (2004).
However, in their four treatments, they identified all subjects,
no subjects, the top two donors in a group, and the bottom two
donors in a group, with the last two treatments meant to isolate
prestige and shame. In this study, Samek and Sheremeta found
that shame was a stronger motivator than prestige, and caused
about the same increase in donations as identifying all donors.
Later, Samek and Sheremeta (2015) performed a framed field
experiment, in which groups of subjects in the lab split a per-
sonal endowment between themselves and a charitable dona-
tion to the Red Cross, with the same four treatments. In this
study, the authors observed strong positive effects of both pres-
tige and shame on giving.
However, in their pursuit to isolate the effect of shame in the
lab in these papers, the authors have adopted a laboratory treat-
ment which no longer maps back to charitable donations in the
field. In their shame treatment, when they publicly identify
donors who give the least, they pursue a strategy that charities
would never use in practice. As an example, the authors refer-
ence Ensign (2010), which describes two Ivy league schools that
decided to shame seniors who did not contribute to class gift
campaigns. However, this is a poor example because students
share a distinct and lifelong connection to their alma mater that
individuals do not share with a charity.3 Compounding this
problem, despite the lasting connection between student and
university, Ensign (2010) notes that the persistent contact and
targeting associated with the shaming strategy turned off many
students from contributing. While Samek and Sheremeta (2015)
do acknowledge this problem, they only mention that the abil-
3 Even if a student is shamed in a senior glass gift campaign for not donating,
they cannot change the school they attended, and will still be an alumni of
the school for the rest of their life. This lasting bond is not present between
members of charity’s donor bases and the charities. If a charity shames an
existing donor, the donor can just contribute to a different cause, or not
contribute at all.
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ity to retain donors while pursuing negative recognition strate-
gies is an interesting avenue for future research.
As we consider the giver’s mind, it is important to remember
the aspirations of this line of research. While economists will
never be able to describe every mental factor contributing to the
donation decision-making process, they have identified impor-
tant categorical pieces of the process. These pieces, which in-
clude altruism, warm glow, and social pressure, and in recogni-
tion situations, prestige and shame, are particularly important
because they can inform charities decisions as they attempt to
raise more funds from existing donor bases. For example, char-
ities now know that applying social pressure is a good way to
induce small donations, but a bad way to induce large ones.
On an even broader scale, discoveries about the giver’s mind
give us insight into the set of preferences a charity must ap-
peal to if they seek to induce more donations. As previously
mentioned, heterogeneity necessitates casting a wide net, and
searching for a diverse set of preferences that may motivate
donations. In any situation, it would be a gross simplification
to attribute an individual donation-decision to a single prefer-
ence. However, in specific scenarios, different donors will be
primarily motivated by different preferences. Therefore, devel-
oping a comprehensive set of preferences will allow charities
to tailor their fundraising efforts to the relative prevalence and
dominance of different preferences within their existing donor
bases, increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of fundraising
campaigns.
3
E M P I R I C A L S T R AT E G Y
In the charitable giving literature, economists use both field
and laboratory experiments to test their behavioral hypotheses.
These two approaches offer different strengths and weaknesses.
The advantage of laboratory studies is the potential for true ce-
teris paribus observation of individual economic decision mak-
ers, which is difficult to obtain in the field. However, while it
is tempting to quickly extrapolate laboratory results to broader
applications, it is important to remember that results from the
laboratory do not automatically correspond with the field. To
mitigate this problem economists also run field experiments,
utilizing randomization in naturally occurring settings, where
they have significantly less control over individuals, but are
able to test certain strategies on large groups (See DellaVigna
(2009) for a broad survey).
3.1 the laboratory game
I have opted to utilize a laboratory experiment in this paper in
an effort to isolate the specific mechanism through which recog-
nition motivates charitable contributions. The experiment is a
provision point mechanism, which Rondeau (1999, 2005) estab-
lishes as an efficient simulation of a public good in a laboratory
setting.1 The following procedure, which borrows heavily from
Rondeau and List (2008), was applied in all treatments. Sub-
jects entered a room and sat in a circle at desks, with the exper-
imenter in the circle. The experimenter then gave printed-out
instructions to each subject individually. The subjects had 10
minutes to read the instructions and make a decision, at which
point they were asked to make a final decision and all materi-
1 All subjects in the study were Bowdoin undergraduate students. Subjects
were selected on a first-come first-serve basis if they responded to an ad-
vertisement in Bowdoin’s Student Digest, an online message board which is
distributed by email to all students.
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als were collected. Subjects were not allowed to communicate
for the duration of the experiment, and at its conclusion, af-
ter filling out an exit survey, each subject received any payouts
associated with their participation in cash.
Subjects played the game in groups of 6. They were each
given a $12 endowment and asked to distribute it between a
private account and group investment fund. The group had
a threshold of $45, and if the threshold was met or exceeded,
each member of the group received a fixed payout, as well as
a proportional net rebate of $0.20 for each dollar the fund ex-
ceeded the threshold by. If the fund did not exceed the thresh-
old, subjects received all of their money back. Each subject
had a $9 fixed payout; however, subjects were told that the
payoff amounts from the investment fund were randomly as-
signed. This element of the experiment eliminated any dom-
inant strategy, as subjects had no knowledge regarding other
subjects’ payoffs.
The game’s three separate treatments each included their
own set of instructions (Appendix A). These treatments intro-
duced recognition to the experiment. In one treatment, at the
conclusion of the game, the top three contributors to the invest-
ment fund were announced by name, along with the amount
they each donated to the fund. In the second treatment, at
the game’s conclusion, the top contributor was recognized by
name and donation size. The third treatment was a control
group with no recognition. In the event of ties for top donors,
the proper number of subjects were selected at random from
the group who tied for the top donation(s).
Upon entering the lab, each subject participated in all three
treatments before leaving. To accommodate more subjects, the
results of only one treatment per subject, chosen at random,
were realized. To accommodate this structure, a subject would
enter, and participate in each of their three treatments in suc-
cession. At the end of the third treatment, the experimenter
announced which treatment was being realized, and any recog-
nition outcomes associated with that treatment, if applicable.
In an effort to control for learning from previous experience, I
randomized the treatment’s presentation order across different
subject groups.
The game is structured to isolate the effect of recognition on
donations to a public good. This structure is analogous to do-
nating to charity because the lack of information about other
subjects’ payoffs from the investment fund eliminates any dom-
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inant strategy. Therefore, each subject’s only personal incentive
to contribute more to the public good is to help the group break
the threshold, except insofar as breaking the threshold benefits
them. There is no guarantee a subject receives more money
by contributing, and there is even a possibility a subject may
lose money if they give a large amount and their group barely
breaks the threshold, so any donation to the fund is prosocial
behavior, reflecting a subject’s preference to contribute to a pub-
lic good.
The structure of the game warrants a close consideration of
which data provides a true representation of subject’s prefer-
ences. The first, and most obvious, approach to analyzing re-
sults is to use every observation from each treatment in com-
parisons. However, individuals undergo a different experience
in lab based on the random order in which the treatments are
presented. While subjects have no opportunity to learn from
treatment to treatment because no results are announced until
the conclusion of the session, their decisions in later treatments
may be skewed as they begin to understand what varies be-
tween treatments.
For example, if a subject is presented with the control treat-
ment, followed by a recognition treatment, the subject will know
that recognition is being tested in some capacity. Their experi-
ence and decision in the recognition treatment will therefore
be fundamentally different than if that treatment had been pre-
sented to them first. As Levitt and List (2007) outline, subjects
tend to fulfill the perceived wishes of their experimenters, and
therefore, if subjects realize recognition is being tested, they
may be inclined to donate more than otherwise.2
To further confound the process, subjects might base subse-
quent decisions off of their first decision. In this case, subjects
might systematically decrease or increase their contributions
based on treatment variation, using their first decision as a
baseline. Or, subjects may not care about variation between
treatments, and return to their first decision as a viable option
for each subsequent treatment, regardless of variation in levels
of recognition.
Even if bias pervades all decisions except the treatments pre-
sented to subjects first, there is a reasonable expectation that
2 This effect could also cause a decrease in donations in a single recognition
treatment following a half recognition treatment, or vice versa, depending
on subject’s opinions of which treatment experimenters believed should in-
duce more donations.
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I will be able to achieve statistically significant results when
comparing treatments. Figure 1 presents a power calculation
using data from Rege and Telle (2004), who conduct a similar
laboratory study testing recognition’s effect on donations to a
public good. After scaling their results to US dollars and a
$12 endowment, they observe an approximate $4 shift in mean
contributions when introducing recognition. The shift they ob-
serve comfortably exceeds the mean shift necessary to observe
a significant difference in means with 70% power at a sample
size of 48. This provides evidence that even if I am restricted to
the 24 observations per treatment that are presented to subjects
first in subsequent analysis, I still should be able to observe
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Figure 1 −− Power Calculation Utilizing Rege and Telle (2004)
Contribution Data
In summary, when a subject participates in multiple subse-
quent treatments, there are a variety of factors that might influ-
ence the likelihood and magnitude of their donations. While
quantifying the size of these potential biases is one approach to
controlling for this problem, another is to utilize only the sub-
set of data including treatments that were presented to subjects
first. This subset of data provides a simple means of observ-
ing subjects’ true preferences, and can be expected to produce
significant results with 70% power.
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3.2 recognition mechanism hypothesis
Shame and prestige both motivate individuals to give to char-
ity in recognition situations. Harbaugh (1998) defines prestige
as the utility that comes directly from having the amount of a
donation publicly known, while Samek and Sheremeta (2015)
isolate shame by recognizing the lowest donors in a group. De-
spite the two preferences’ differences, a donation motivated
by either one seeks to accomplish one goal, receiving recog-
nition. Therefore, donors motivated by prestige should seek
to contribute enough to receive recognition, and the prestige
associated with that recognition, while donors motivated by
shame should seek to contribute enough to receive recognition,
and avoid the shame associated with not receiving recognition.
Thus, the amount individuals donate should be based upon
their own expectations regarding other donations.
While Samek and Sheremeta (2015) are able to isolate shame
in a lab experiment, to do so, the experimenters sacrifice the
ability to generalize their results to actual strategies charities
might employ. Rather than attempt to distinguish between
shame and prestige, I allow them to both operate simultane-
ously.
Hypothesis 1: When a charity offers recognition, donors con-
tribute more in an effort to receive recognition, based on their
expectations of what it will take to receive recognition, regard-
less of whether that contribution is motivated by shame or pres-
tige.
The unique results of DellaVigna et al. (2012) present an in-
triguing empirical strategy to test for the effect of a specific
preference or set of preferences in a public good setting. In
their case, removing social pressure from potential donors led
to a decrease in the type of contributions that most readily mit-
igated the social pressure, contributions of $10 or less. In a
similar manner, to test hypothesis 1, I will search for the ab-
sence of donations in non-recognition situations that would
be specifically made to acquire prestige or avoid shame. In
other words, if there is a spike in larger donations in recogni-
tion treatments, this will provide evidence that subjects were
making those donation-decisions to receive recognition, either
to acquire prestige or avoid shame.
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One consequence of this hypothesis is that recognition should
have a larger effect on contributions for those donors whose
preference is to give less in non-recognition situations. As
Samek and Sheremeta (2015) propose, recognition introduces
tournament-like incentives to the fundraising process. The vic-
tors of this competition both acquire prestige and avoid shame.
In the context of a heterogeneous existing donor base, offers of
recognition will provide little incentive to those who already
prefer to give significant amounts to give more, because they
already are in a position to receive recognition. On the other
hand, offers of recognition should have a strong effect on those
whose preference is to give relatively less, because to incorpo-
rate shame and prestige into their decision, and realistically,
to receive recognition, they have to diverge significantly from
their preferences in a non-recognition situation.
3.3 optimal donor recognition proportion
The structure of the laboratory game also provides an opportu-
nity to compare different donor recognition proportions. Previ-
ous studies including Rege and Telle (2004), Dana et al. (2006),
and Samek and Sheremeta (2013) have established that com-
plete recognition encourages prosocial behavior. That is to say,
in the context of this laboratory game, identifying every donor
and the amount they contributed at the conclusion of the game
would increase the amount they contributed. However, chari-
ties do not always recognize every donor, and in many cases,
only recognize a small fraction of donors.
This presents an optimization problem. For each additional
donor recognized, the distinguishing nature of that recognition
diminishes, but for each additional donor, the chance of receiv-
ing recognition increases. Therefore, in an attempt to answer
this question empirically, I have selected two treatments involv-
ing partial recognition of top donors. While some data points
already exist regarding the effect of recogniton on prosocial
behavior, I add two more to the argument by including half
recognition and single recognition (or 1/6th of donors). While
a more rigorous answer to the question of optimal recognition
levels would require a large scale randomized control experi-
ment, this approach allows for the development of some mod-
est intuition suggesting that either more or less recognition is
superior.
4
R E S U LT S
Table 1 provides a brief overview of the results from all treat-
ments. One clear pattern is that subjects give more in both
recognition treatments. While subjects in the half recognition
treatment give slightly more on average than those in the sin-
gle recognition treatment, the difference is not nearly as large
as between either recognition treatment and the control.
Table 1 – Dollar Contributions in Different Lab Treatments
Treatment: Control Single Recognition Half Recognition
Mean 7.99 8.44 8.59
Median 8 9 9
Std Dev 3.29 2.82 3.20
Minimum 0 0 0
Maximum 12 12 12
Observations = 72
To further tease out the difference between treatments, Ta-
ble 2 presents exact p-values from two sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests for distributional equality between treatments.
All of these tests fail to reject the null hypothesis that the sam-
ple contribution distributions for different lab treatments come
from the same underlying distribution.
Table 2 – Exact p-values: Two Sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests




Observations = 144 per test
Ho: Both samples come from the same underlying distribution
The results of these tests suggest that either we cannot rule out
the possibility that the contribution distributions are the same
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for every treatment, or that the data used in the tests do not
accurately reflect subjects’ preferences.
4.1 treatments presented first are unbiased
As previously mentioned, it is possible that a number of biases
are introduced into subjects’ decision making processes for the
second and third treatment they participate in while in the lab-
oratory. Therefore, the data from only those treatments that
were presented to subjects first should provide a more unbiased
view of their preferences. Table 3 presents summary statistics
for these observations.
Table 3 – Dollar Contributions in Different Lab Treatments
Presented First
Treatment: Control Single Recognition Half Recognition
Mean 7.69 9.23 9.73
Median 8 9.50 9.50
Std Dev 3.18 1.91 2.52
Minimum 0 5 1
Maximum 12 12 12
Observations = 24
The difference between contributions in both recognition treat-
ments and the control is much more pronounced in the treat-
ments presented to subjects first. These statistics suggest that
there is a distinct difference between all the data collected, and
the first-presented data. Lending further credence to this argu-
ment, Table 4 presents the same Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests as
above on this subset of data.
Table 4 – Exact p-values: Two Sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Tests for Treatments Presented First




Observations = 48 per test
Ho: Both samples come from the same underlying distribution
While the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests fail to reject the null hy-
pothesis that the sample contribution distributions for the sin-
gle recognition and half recognition treatments are the same,
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this round of tests rejects the hypothesis that the half recogni-
tion sample and control sample come from the same underly-
ing distribution. This serves as an indication that the donation
decision-making process is fundamentally different in recogni-
tion situations, and this difference is also reflected in the sum-
mary statistics in Table 3.
Table 5 presents summary statistics for demographic infor-
mation collected in an exit survey for the unbiased treatments
that were presented first. This data suggests good randomiza-
tion between treatments, reinforcing the validity of these re-
sults. For many of the statistics, we cannot reject the null hy-
pothesis that the mean from the control does not differ from
the mean in the single recognition or half recognition treatment.
For race, whether a subject is a senior, subject class year, and
whether the subject is a social science major, there is some in-
dication that we should reject this null hypothesis. I return to
these variables in subsequent analysis.
Table 5 – Demographic Statistics By Treatments Presented First
(mean) (mean) (mean) S - C H - C
Control Single Half p-value p-value
% Financial Aid 54 58 46 0.777 0.573
% Female 67 50 79 0.251 0.340
% Minority 32 25 13 0.229 0.023
% Seniors 25 50 42 0.076 0.229
% STEM 42 33 33 0.561 0.561
% Soc Science 29 42 54 0.376 0.082
% Know 29 21 50 0.515 0.146
Class 2017.83 2017.13 2017.21 0.106 0.058
Family Income 220 183 481 0.596 0.374
Observations = 48 per test
Ho: The difference between the two sample means is 0
Family Income in $100,000s per Year
STEM majors: biology, chemistry, physics, biochemistry,
neuroscience, math and computer science
Social Science majors: economics, psychology, government,
anthropology, and sociology
% Know: The percentage of subjects who knew other subjects
in their group of 6
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4.2 prestige and shame motivate additional con-
tributions
The kernel density plot below provides clear evidence that sub-
jects motivated by prestige and/or shame increase their contri-
butions in lab treatments including recognition. In both recog-
nition treatments, there is a noticeable increase compared to the
control group in donations over $9. The only additional util-
ity offered to subjects in recognition treatments was prestige,
or avoiding shame, both of which required receiving recogni-
tion. Therefore, we can attribute the increase in contributions
in recognition treatments to these two motivations, as well as in-
fer that most subjects believed they had to donate more than $9
to receive recognition. It is possible that $9 is a reference point
for recognition because that was each subject’s payoff from the
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Figure 2 −− Kernel Density Plots of Amount Donated
in Treatments Presented First
Intuitively, we would expect that recognition has a stronger
effect on subjects whose preference is to give less when prestige
and shame are not part of their donation-decision. In a group
of donors with heterogeneous preferences, some will prefer to
contribute more than others in non-recognition situations. If
recognition is introduced to these potential donors, those who
prefer to give less in non-recognition situations will have to
donate significantly more to receive recognition, while those
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who prefer to give more will not have to change their preferred
donation amount as much to receive recognition.
By examining the shift in different quartiles of the contribu-
tion data, we can make across-subject comparisons that reflect
heterogeneous preferences, and test for different recognition ef-
fects on different groups of subjects. In the box plot below, the
control distribution represents a baseline contribution distribu-
tion in which some are motivated to give most or all of their
endowment to the group fund, while others prefer to give very
little. Regardless of control subjects’ initial preferences, no con-
tributions in the group were influenced by prestige or shame.
Somewhat surprisingly, we do not clearly observe a larger in-
crease in contributions across subjects in the bottom two quar-
tiles than in the top two. While the lowest contributions in
the second quartile of either recognition treatment exceed the
median and mean in the control treatment, right-censoring at
$12 makes it difficult to observe the true shift in contributions
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Figure 3 −− Box Plots of Amount Donated
in Treatments Presented First
To further test the hypothesis that recognition should have a
stronger effect on those subjects who give less in non-recognition
situations, I run doubly censored least absolute deviation esti-
mations (dCLAD) and censored quantile regressions in Table
6. This technique is similar to a Tobit regression, but does not
rely on normal error distributions. The results in Table 6 can
be interpreted as estimating the magnitude of the effect of each
treatment type on the first quartile cut-off, in column 1, the
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median, in column 2, and the third-quartile cut off, in column
3.1
These estimations reinforce the inconclusive nature of the evi-
dence supporting a larger recognition effect for donors who pre-
fer to give less in non-recognition situations. The single recog-
nition treatment has an insignificant effect on the first quartile,
median, and third quartile. While the half recognition treat-
ment has significant effects on the median and third quartile,
it has an insignificant effect on the first quartile. This does not
provide evidence that recognition has a larger effect on donors
who prefer to give less in non-recognition situations. However,
it does not rule it out either, particularly because quantile esti-
mators tend to be noisier with small sample sizes.2
Table 6 – Effects of Recognition Treatments on Contributions
For Treatments Presented First: dCLAD Estimations
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile
Half Recognition 2 2** 3**
(1.232) (0.991) (1.361)
Single Recognition 1 1 1
(1.344) (0.665) (1.551)
Constant 7*** 8*** 9***
(1.126) (0.290) (1.337)
Observations 72 72 72
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
While it appears that shame and prestige should have a larger
effect on donors whose preference is to give less in non-recognition
situations, the evidence collected here does not support that
conclusion. It is possible that a larger sample size could more
1 Doubly censored least absolute deviations estimation, or dCLAD, is similar
to CLAD estimation (Powell (1986)), but accounts for right and left censor-
ing, as is appropriate in this case. Matthew Botsch provided the dCLAD
estimation script.
2 Another explanation for these results stems from the game instructions.
Both $9 and $12 appear repeatedly in the instructions, and it is possible
these numbers stick with subjects as they make their donation-decisions.
This could increase contributions at the higher end of the distribution be-
cause subjects thinking about increasing a donation in a recognition situa-
tion might increase their donation more to reach a $9 or $12 cutoff, a consid-
eration which is not present for subjects at the lower end of the contribution
distribution.
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clearly identify the size of recognition’s effect on different sub-
groups of subjects. Despite this uncertainty, there is clear evi-
dence that both shame and prestige motivate additional contri-
butions. This indicates that recognition is a worthwhile strat-
egy for charities to pursue, and that it does motivate donors to
contribute more.
4.3 charities should recognize a large proportion
of their donors
When charities decide what proportion of donors to recognize,
they must weigh the benefits of increasing the probability a
donor is recognized with the costs of reducing the value of that
recognition. Results from this laboratory study suggest that a
charity will induce more contributions by recognizing a larger
proportion of their donor base. As Wilhelm (2008) suggests, I
perform both Tobit and dCLAD estimations to test for the ef-
fect of the different treatment statuses on contributions, and
whether results between tests differ in an economically mean-
ingful way.
Table 7 – Effects of Recognition Treatments on Contributions
For Treatments Presented First: Tobit Estimations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit
Half 2.676*** 2.701** 2.674** 2.695***
(0.988) (1.036) (1.042) (1.060)
Single 1.685* 1.698* 1.650 1.662
(0.967) (0.981) (1.002) (1.008)




% Social Science -0.091
(0.927)
Constant 7.862*** 7.829*** 7.776*** 7.803***
(0.684) (0.792) (0.824) (0.859)
Observations 72 72 72 72
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7 presents Tobit regression results. Column 1 includes
only dummy variables specifying treatment type, and these re-
sults suggest that the half recognition treatment increases con-
tributions by approximately 22% of the endowment (signifi-
cant at the 1% level), while the single recognition treatment in-
creases contributions by approximately 14% (significant at the
10% level).
Given the relatively successful randomization between treat-
ments presented in Table 5, including race, whether a subject is
a senior, and whether a subject is a social science major in Tobit
specifications are obvious robustness checks. These alternative
specifications are displayed in columns 2, 3 and 4. However,
the coefficients on all of these variables are both economically
small and insignificant, providing evidence that any lack of ran-
domization across treatments had little impact on contributions.
The same lack of economic and statistical significance holds
for a number of Tobit specifications including log(income), gen-
der, whether a subject is on financial aid, and subject social
networks.
Already displayed above, Table 6 presents the results of dCLAD
estimations examining the effect of treatment types on the me-
dian and other quartile contributions. Column 2 suggests that
the half recognition treatment will increase the median contri-
bution by $2 (significant at the 1% level), while the single recog-
nition treatment will increase the median by $1 (p < 0.124).
These results are in line with the Tobit results, and both provide
evidence that while the single recognition treatment induces
marginally more contributions from donors, the half recogni-
tion treatment induces significantly more contributions.
This difference provides evidence that charities should opt
to recognize a large proportion of their donors whenever they
offer recognition. These results do not rule out the possibility
that recognition may decrease in value as a larger proportion of
a donor’s peer group receives that recognition. However, they
do indicate that in terms of power to induce further contribu-
tions, the chance for more individuals to receive recognition
dominates this decreasing value of recognition.
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C O N C L U S I O N
Much of the charitable giving literature is focused on helping
charities to raise additional funds within the constraints of their
own resources. In this paper, I investigate the power of personal
recognition to help charities induce contributions from an exist-
ing donor base. In my laboratory game, I find that recognizing
the top half of donors corresponds to a 22% increase in contri-
butions, while recognizing the top donor corresponds to a 14%
increase in contributions. Both prestige and shame motivate
these increases in contributions, though it is unclear whether
these two motivations resonate more strongly with those who
prefer to give less in non-recognition situations. In addition, I
collect evidence that charities are better off recognizing a larger
proportion of their donors rather than a smaller one, as the in-
crease in contributions due to an increasing chance of recogni-
tion dominates any decrease in contributions due to recognition
losing value as it is spread between more donors.
An important task for future research will be to quantify the
magnitude of recognition’s effect in the field, and more rigor-
ously test different donor recognition proportions. This study
provides evidence that shame and prestige are true components
of the decision making process in a public good situation, and
subsequent field experiments should capitalize on this informa-
tion by emphasizing these components.
There are also many interesting variants of the laboratory
game I constructed. One possibility is to vary endowment
size to explore the effects of wealth disparity on recognition’s
ability to motivate contributions. Another interesting variant
would include both random and absolute recognition systems.
In the random system, a top proportion of donors would be
recognized, as in this experiment, while in the absolute sys-
tem, donors contributing above a fixed threshold would receive
recognition. This experiment could help unpack which sys-
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tem induces more contributions, and which strategy charities
should employ.
Another important task for future research is to search for
proof of shame in positive recognition situations. In this paper,
I did not distinguish between shame and recognition, but they
are two distinct motivations. If we are able to identify shame
in isolation in positive recognition situations, it would provide
more proof that identifying a high proportion of donors is a
good strategy, because the smaller the unrecognized group, the
more acute shame should be. Information like this can continue
to advance charities understandings of the preferences that mo-
tivate their existing donor bases to contribute, and can improve
charities fundraising practices in the future.
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 Appendix A: The Investment Game 
[Treatment variation in italics] 
 
Experiment Instructions  
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. 
If you follow these instructions closely and make a careful 
decision, you will earn money. Do not communicate with any 
other participant during the experiment.  
OVERVIEW:  
 In today’s experiment, you are part of a group of six (6) 
people.  
 To start the experiment, we give you, and every other 
participant an initial balance of $12.  
 Once you have read and understood these instructions, you 
will be asked to divide your $12 between a “private 
account” and a “group investment fund”. You can put any 
amount between $0 and $12 into either account, but the 
total of the two accounts must equal $12.  
 Any money that you deposit in your private account is 
yours to keep and will be paid in cash.  
 The money you put in the group investment fund will be 
combined with the money received from all other members 
of your group.  
 The group investment fund has a single investment 
opportunity with a minimum investment cost of $45. 
Hence, in order for the investment to be made by the group 
investment fund, the total amount of money placed in the 
investment fund must equal or exceed $45.  
 If the total amount of money in the investment fund is 
below $45, no investment will be made and the amount of 
money you put in the fund will be refunded to you.  
 On the other hand, if the total amount of money in the 
investment fund equals or exceeds $45, the investment will 
be made and each member of your group will receive a 
personal payoff from the investment. The payoff you could 
receive is indicated in Table 1 of the attached “Information 
and Decision Sheet”. Look at your Information and 
Decision Sheet now to see what your personal payoff 
would be if $45 or more are placed in the investment fund.  
  If the amount of money in the investment fund exceeds 
$45, the excess will also be invested and you will receive 
an additional payoff for each dollar in the fund in excess of 
$45. Table 1 also indicates how many cents you will 
receive for each dollar in the investment fund in excess of 
$45.  
 [After all investments in the group investment fund have 
been recorded, your group will be told the names of the 
three investors in your group that contributed the most, and 
the amounts they contributed.   /   After all investments in 
the group investment fund have been recorded, your group 
will be told the name of the investor that contributed the 
most, and the amount they contributed. ] 
 Note that you have been randomly assigned to your 
personal and additional payoff amounts and that the payoffs 
of other members of your group may differ from yours.  
CALCULATION OF YOUR EARNINGS:  
Your earnings for the experiment depend on how you choose to 
divide your initial balance of $12 between your private account 
and the investment fund. They also depend on whether or not the 
total amount of money in the investment fund equals or exceeds 
the investment cost of $45. There are three possible outcomes:  
FIRST POSSIBLE OUTCOME: the total amount in the 
investment fund is LESS than $45. In this case, the investment 
cannot be made and the amount you put in the group investment 
fund will be refunded. This is a Money-Back-Guarantee: if the 
minimum investment cost is not reached, the full amount of your 
contribution to the investment fund will be refunded to you. 
Therefore, if the total amount in the investment fund is less than 
$45, your earnings for the experiment will be equal to your initial 
balance of $12.  
SECOND POSSIBLE OUTCOME: the total amount in the 
investment fund is EXACTLY $45.  
In this case, all $45 received by the investment fund will be 
invested. You will receive your personal payoff from the 
investment. Every other member of your group will also receive a 
payoff. Therefore, if the minimum investment cost of $45 is 
exactly met, your earnings for the experiment would be equal to 
the amount you deposit in your private account, plus your personal 
payoff from the group fund (as indicated in Table 1).  
 THIRD POSSIBLE OUTCOME: the total amount in the 
investment fund is GREATER than $45. In this case, all of the 
money received by the group fund will be invested. You will 
receive your personal payoff and every other member of your 
group will also receive a personal payoff. In addition, the amount 
of money in excess of $45 will provide you and all other members 
of your group with an additional payoff for each dollar in the 
investment fund in excess of $45 (your rate of additional payoff is 
indicated in Table 1). Therefore, if the investment cost is exceeded, 
your earnings for the experiment would be the amount you deposit 
in your private account, plus your personal payoff from the group 
fund, plus your additional payoff for each dollar in the investment 
fund in excess of $45.   
SUMMARY:  
 You are part of a group of six individuals.  
 You and all other members of the group have received $12.  
 You must decide how much of your $12 to deposit into a 
private account, and how much to put into a group 
investment fund.  
 [Your group’s three largest contributors will be publicly 
identified.   /   Your group’s largest contributor will be 
publicly identified.] 
 If the sum in the investment fund is less than $45, no 
investment will be made but a money-back guarantee 
ensures that your earnings for the experiment will be equal 
to your initial balance of $12.  
 If the sum in the investment fund is equal to $45, all of the 
money in the fund will be invested and you will receive the 
personal payoff indicated on the attached information sheet. 
Your earnings for the experiment would be the amount you 
deposited into your private account plus your payoff from 
the group fund.  
 If the sum in the investment fund is greater than $45, all of 
the money in the fund will be invested and you will receive 
your personal payoff. You will also receive an additional 
payoff for every dollar in the investment fund in excess of 
$45. Your earnings for the experiment would be the amount 
you deposited into your private account, plus your personal 
payoff from the group fund, plus your additional payoff.  
YOUR TASK:  
1) You must now decide how to divide your $12 between 
your private account and the group investment fund. This 
 decision is strictly confidential and will not be revealed to 
anyone.  
2) To indicate your decision, you must fill out the bottom 
portion of the attached decision sheet.  
3) Indicate how much of your $12 you are depositing in 
your private account and how much you are depositing into 
the group investment fund. Make sure that the sum of these 
two amounts equals $12.  
Once everyone has completed the form, these instructions 
and the form will be collected. This will end the 
experiment. Your decision will be entered into a computer 
along with those of all other members of your group to 
determine whether the investment by the group fund will be 
made and to calculate your earnings. Your earnings will be 
paid to you in cash.  
 
All information regarding your personal decisions, 
payoff and earnings is strictly confidential and will not 
be revealed to anyone [unless you are one of the three 
largest contributors in your group   /   unless you are the 
largest contributor in your group]. 
It is very important you that you understand these 









 Table 1  
Information and Decision Sheet  
YOUR INITIAL BALANCE  $12.00  
YOUR PERSONAL PAYOFF  $9.00  
YOUR ADDITIONAL PAYOFF FOR EACH DOLLAR 
IN THE INVESTMENT FUND IN EXCESS OF $45  
$0.20  
PLEASE WRITE LEGIBLY  
SUBJECT ID NUMBER: ___________________________ 
 
How much of your $12 do you put into your PRIVATE 
ACCOUNT:___________ 
How much of your $12 do you put into the GROUP 
INVESTMENT FUND:_________ 
MAKE SURE THAT THE TOTAL OF THE TWO AMOUNTS 
ABOVE IS EQUAL TO $12  
 
 
 
 
